The Editors’ Quote of the Day:

“What a place! What a situation! What kind of man would put a known criminal in charge of a major branch of government? Apart from, say, the average voter.” – Terry Pratchett, Going Postal


  1. Another timely Terry Pratchett quote!

    I’m thinking it’s time for a serious and truthful and transparent investigation of the Bidens to be followed up impeachment in the House, and removal from office upon conviction in the Senate. Highly unlikely, I know…

    Remember this?

    “How five members of Joe Biden’s family got rich through his connections”

    …and maybe Peter Schweizer is hard at work as an investigative journalist. There is likely a follow up to Profiles in Corruption coming! …or so I hope!

    Certainly a complication is the probability that Regime Commander Joe Biden is suffering from cognitive decline and dementia. This, in and of itself, is a human tragedy. When foist upon a nation, this nation, it’s a national and even an international catastrophe.

    How would the Senate ever be able to try any person cognitively impaired? …and if Regime Leader Biden is not truly at the helm (a reasonable and sobering question), then others must be conducting and completing work on his behalf. Perhaps these individuals should be examined for any crimes committed against the country.

    From Sky News: “‘Never before’ has the leader of the free world been ‘so cognitively compromised’”

    I am also wondering about one news suggestion that the National Guard will be in place through September, and so I ask… What is it about September, and why the advance announcement? Another news report suggested the Guard would be in place until the end of the year. What in the world is going on?

    It certainly makes me wonder if current VP will ascend into the official and public position of Regime Leader before then — or around that time? Perhaps they want the Guard in place for the coming “peaceful transition of power”?

    Remember this… American Patriots have the right to their political voices, and should be using them to speak up — peacefully and civilly, but heard! Thank God for the wisdom of our Founders and the Constitution they provided us.

    1. TofA, you say so clearly, “Remember this… American Patriots have the right to their political voices, and should be using them to speak up — peacefully and civilly, but heard!”

      As I and others have noted before, our economic voices carry great weight. Is Joe Biden Joe Stalin? Too early to tell, methinks. We have some sway there. Stalin took advantage of bad economic times. We may be able, through our humble efforts, to forestall a famine and depression. At least in the local areas where we have the most clout. Hungry people are easily victimized.

      Here is a link and part of the article:

      Onto the changes in economic activity we can now map the changes in conflict (Russian defeat in World War I, then Bolshevik victory in the Civil War), state capacity (the Russian Empire collapsed and was replaced by a communist state), and the policy regime (the Russian imperial state tried to regulate the war economy rather ineffectively; the communists quickly turned to violent methods of mass mobilisation, were eventually forced to draw back, permitted the revival of a regulated market economy, and then returned to extreme coercion).

      Our paper looks first at the impact of the First World War, in which Russia fought against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Initially, the war went well for Russia because Germany found itself unexpectedly tied down on the western front. Even so, Germany quickly turned back the initial Russian offensive and would have defeated Russia altogether but for its inability to concentrate forces there.

      During the war nearly all the major European economies declined; Britain was the exception. The main reason was that the strains of mobilisation began to pull them apart, with the industrialised cities going in one direction and the countryside going in the other way. In that context, we find that Russia’s economic performance was better than has been thought. Our study shows that until the year of the 1917, Revolution Russia’s economy was declining, but by no more than any other continental power. While wartime economic trends shed some light on the causes of the Russian Revolution, they certainly do not support an economically deterministic story; if anything, our account leaves more room for political agency than previous studies.

      In the two years following the Revolution, there was an economic catastrophe. By 1919, average incomes in Soviet Russia had fallen to less than 600 international dollars at 1990 prices. Less than half that of 1913, this level is experienced today only in the very poorest countries of the world, and had not been seen in Eastern Europe since the 17th century (Maddison 2001). Worse was to come. After a run of disastrous harvests, famine conditions began to appear in the summer of 1920 (in some regions perhaps as early as 1919). In Petrograd in the spring of 1919, an average worker’s daily intake was below 1,600 calories, about half the level before the war. Spreading hunger coincided with a wave of deaths from typhus, typhoid, dysentery and cholera. In 1921, the grain harvest collapsed further, particularly in the southern and eastern grain-farming regions. More than five million people may have died prematurely at this time from hunger and disease.

      Because we have shown that the level of the Russian economy in 1917 was higher than previously thought, we find that the subsequent collapse was correspondingly deeper. What explains this collapse? It is natural to think of the Russian Civil War, which is usually dated from 1918 to 1920. However, we doubt that this is a sufficient explanation.

      First, although economically damaging, armed conflict between the two sides was geographically and temporally sporadic. The economic decline was most rapid in 1918; fighting was widespread only in 1919.
      Second, there are signs that Bolshevik policies of economic mobilisation and class warfare acted independently to spread chaos and decline. These policies were continued and intensified as the civil war drew to a close during 1920, and clearly contributed to the famine of 1921.
      Because of the famine, economic recovery did not begin until 1922. At first, recovery was very rapid, promoted by pro-market reforms, but it slowed markedly as the Soviet government began to revert to mobilisation policies of the civil war type. We confirm that Russian incomes in 1928 were still somewhat below the level of 1913, and that recovery was lagging by international standards. For this reason, we regard the somewhat favourable view of the mobilisation policies that Allen (2003) has put forward as unduly optimistic. Moreover, some of the economic growth achieved subsequently under Stalin’s five-year plans should be attributed to delayed restoration of pre-revolutionary economic capacity.

      Carry on

Comments are closed.