Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) risk assessments have been published by journalists, defense analysts, and foreign policy experts. Unfortunately, some of these assessments rely on incomplete or incorrect information and give the mistaken impression that EMP is not an immediate threat. For example, STRATFOR Global Intelligence recently published a report titled “Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.” The report assesses that the risk from an EMP attack is low because “the EMP threat has been around for more than half a century and there are a number of technical and practical variables that make a HEMP [High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse] attack using a nuclear warhead highly unlikely.”
STRATFOR is a well-respected organization that publishes many excellent reports on national security threats. However, this particular report is badly flawed, suffering from both analytical misconceptions and factual errors. Below I quote from the report, describing why this assessment should not be relied on. (STRATFOR generously allows republishing of its reports with the following statement: Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack is republished with permission of STRATFOR.)
“Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an [EMP] attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.)”
The report makes the error of assuming that any EMP attack would be carried out with a single nuclear warhead that must be centered above the continental United States for maximum effect. An immediate result of any EMP attack would be the destruction of power grids within line-of-sight of the nuclear detonation. The continental United States has only three power grids—Eastern, Western, and Texas. Therefore, an effective EMP attack need not be a single detonation over the center of the US, but could instead consist of two separate detonations over the Eastern and Western power grids. Such an attack could easily be carried out by Scud missiles. Moreover, as the 9/11 attacks showed, it is well within the capability of terrorist organizations or rogue states to conduct simultaneous attacks.
The STRATFOR report states: “Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense…Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. …In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.”
The report assumes that any country or group capable of conducting an EMP attack would share the mindset of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There is a substantial body of thought that Iran in particular would not be subject to these same principals of nuclear deterrence. Bernard Lewis, the noted Middle Eastern scholar, has stated, “MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the cold war. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement.” While there is substantial debate over whether the position of Bernard Lewis and other scholars is correct, this position cannot be lightly dismissed.
The STRATFOR report also states: “One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike…Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). (Emphasis added.)”
Their conclusion is factually incorrect. First, a nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude would likely not leave sufficient material at ground level for forensic analysis. Second, the ability of the United States to conduct forensic nuclear analysis has been degrading, as made clear in a recent report by the National Resource Council titled “Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk.” This report reads in part, “Although U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities are substantial and can be improved, right now they are fragile, under-resourced and, in some respects, deteriorating.” Lastly, any nuclear forensic analysis would require continued functioning of national labs such as Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—a dubious proposition if the Western power grid is down.
The STRATFOR report concludes:
“When considering the EMP threat, it is important to recognize that it exists amid a myriad other threats, including related threats such as nuclear warfare and targeted, small-scale HPM attacks. Some things are more likely to occur than others, and there is only a limited amount of funding to monitor, harden against, and try to prevent, prepare for and manage them all. Clear-sighted, well-grounded and rational prioritization of threats is essential to the effective defense of the homeland. But each dollar spent on these efforts must be balanced against a dollar not spent on, for example, port security, which we believe is a far more likely and far more consequential vector for nuclear attack by a rogue state or non-state actor.”
Here the authors confuse the likelihood of various attack scenarios with the consequences of an attack. An EMP attack is of special concern because it would destroy one or more power grids, which are the underpinning of every other critical infrastructure. In contrast, a nuclear attack on a port city—even one as important as Los Angeles/Long Beach—would have a dramatic but localized effect.
In summary, the STRATFOR analysis of the EMP threat fails on two counts. First, the analysis misstates the likelihood of an EMP attack, in both the technical feasibility and motivations of rogue nations such as Iran. Second, the report never explicitly states the consequences of an EMP attack should the US power grids remain unprotected—the likely end of the United States as a functioning country.
The United States Congress is currently considering legislation to protect our power grids against EMP. While Survival Blog emphasizes individual and small group preparedness, another important means of preparation is government action. Should you find the EMP threat credible, please contact your elected representatives. If even 1% of preppers did this, it would represent the equivalent of a tidal wave of letters to Congress. – Thomas P.